

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10982 121927Z

64

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 SAJ-01 NIC-01 MBFR-04 DRC-01

/147 W

----- 074462

R 121559Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1955

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

CINCPAC

SALT TWO GENEVA 166

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

USUN NEW YORK 3113

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 10982

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR

SUBJ: SOVIET REACTION TO CHINESE PARTY CONGRESS

1. SUMMARY: SOVIET ANALYSIS OF CHINESE TENTH PARTY  
CONGRESS, AS EXPRESSED BY MFA CHINA DESK OFFICER AND  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10982 121927Z

IZVESTIA COMMENTARY, CONCLUDES THAT CONGRESS SOLVED  
NONE OF PRESSING DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES FACING PRC

BUT DID MARK IMPORTANT STEP IN STRIKING POWER BALANCE AMONG CONTENDING POLITICAL FIGURES. CHOU EN-LAI'S AUTHORITY IS UNIMPAIRED, BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUITY OF HIS PRAGMATIC LINE ARE NOT BRIGHT ONCE HE PASSES FROM THE SCENE. SOVIETS TAKE SOME COMFORT FROM FACT THAT CHOU "LEFT THE DOOR OPEN" TO NORMALIZATION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, A REITERATION OF POLICY EARLIER EXPRESSED AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL BUT NOT PREVIOUSLY ENSHRINED IN PARTY DOCUMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBOFF CALLED ON MFA CHINA DESK OFFICER TRIFONOV ON SEPTEMBER 11 TO DISCUSS CHINESE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS. TRIFONOV DEVELOPED AT SOME LENGTH THE VIEW THAT PRC DOMESTIC POLICY AFTER THE CONGRESS REMAINED UNCHANGED. EMPHASIS CONTINUED TO BE PLACED ON MASS POLITICS, SELF-SUFFICIENCY, AND HEAVY COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. STEPS WHICH ARE NEEDED TO SPUR INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDE INCENTIVES, ENCOURAGE PRIVATE PLOTS, AND OTHERWISE RATIONALIZE INTERNAL STRUCTURE HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN -- INDEED, THE SHORTNESS OF THE CONGRESS PROBABLY INDICATED THESE QUESTIONS HAD NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED.

3. DOMESTIC PROBLEMS BESETTING PRC WERE MATCHED BY FAILURES OF FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY THE INABILITY OF PEKING TO STOP U.S. -SOVIET DETENTE OR IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. TRIFONOV BELIEVED CHOU EN-LAI WAS HARD PRESSED BY LEFTIST ELEMENTS TO JUSTIFY HIS PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, AND HAD BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT A MORE MILITANT "REVOLUTIONARY" BLEND OF POLICY THAN HE MIGHT HAVE WISHED. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD DEFINITELY EMERGED WITH HIS AUTHORITY UNIMPAIRED.

4. TRIFONOV FELT (AND THIS WAS SECONDED BY BOVIN COMMENTARY IN IZVESTIA WHICH APPEARED EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 11) THAT PRIMARY FOCUS OF CONGRESS HAD BEEN NEW PERSONNEL LINEUP. IN TRIFONOV'S VIEW, ROSTER OF FIVE PARTY VICE-CHAIRMEN AND NINE POLITBURO STANDING  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10982 121927Z

COMMITTEE MEMBERS DID NOT BODE WELL FOR CHOU-STYLE PRAGMATISM AFTER CHOU'S PASSING. AFTER EXCLUDING PARTY VENERABLES WHOSE POSITION LARGELY HONORARY, STRONG MAJORITY OF REMAINING FIGURES WERE LEFTIST RADICALS. EMERGENCE OF ANG HUNG-WEN WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO FIERCE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHOU AND LEFTISTS, THE LATTER PROBABLY CENTERED AROUND CHANG CHUN-CHIAO. FAILURE TO APPOINT A GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY WAS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF SPLIT AMONG LEADERSHIP FACTIONS, AS WAS SECRECY OF

SESSIONS.

5. SOVIETS WERE NOT ABLE TO JUDGE VALIDITY OF CHARGES MADE BY CHOU EN-LAI AGAINST LIN PIAO ABOUT HIS ALLEGED ADVOCACY OF CAPTULATION TO "REVISIONISNE." TRIFONOV DENIED THAT LIN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH USSR; HOWEVER, HE FOUND IT NOTEWORTHY THAT INTERNAL QUARRELS IN 1970 AND 1971 DID OSTENSIBLY REVOLVED AROUND QUESTION INTER ALIA OVERRELATIONS WITH USSR.

6. TRIFONOV REGARDED IT AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT THAT CHOU HAD EXPRESSED FOR FIRST TIME IN REPORT APPROVED BY PARTY THE FORMAL CHINESE POSITION OF DESIRING NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH USSR. THIS STATEMENT, WHICH REITERATED THE POSITION TAKEN IN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS FOLLOWING THE KOSYGIN-CHOU AIRPORT MEETING IN 1969, LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO IMPROVED RELATIONS. TRIFONOV ADDED THAT SOVIETS HAD SEEN NO PRACTICAL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THIS POSITION, HOWEVER.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION HOW SOVIETS INTERPRETED CHOU'S ALLUSION TO LENIN ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPROMISES WITH IMPERIALIST POWERS. TRIFONOV THOUGHT THIS WAS BOTH AN EFFORT TO MALIGN SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES AND A SOP TO LEFTISTS IN PRC WHO WERE AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH SINO-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT. TRIFONOV WARNED THAT CHOU WAS QUITE CAPABLE OF SHIFTING HOSTILE ATTITUDE OVERNIGHT FROM ONE "SUPER-POWER" TO THE OTHER "SUPER-POWER." MOREOVER, THERE WAS STILL STRONG BODY OF LEFTIST OPINION WHICH FAVORED IDEALISTIC  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10982 121927Z

POLICY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THIRD WORLD AND FREEZING RELATIONS WITH BOTH SUPER-POWERS.

8. EMBOFF RAISED WITH TRIFONOV THE SIGNS OF SOVIET DESIRE TO DECLARE CHINA NO LONGER A SOCIALIST COUNTRY. HE DENIED ANY SUCH SOVIET INTENTION AND DISMISSED THIS AS A THEORETICAL QUESTION WHICH HAD NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH PRC. HE WAS SIMILARLY UNCOMMUNICATIVE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT RECENT UPSURGE IN ANTI-CHINESE PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET MEDIA.

9. FIRST MAJOR PUBLISHED ANALYSIS OF CCP CONGRESS ORIGINATED BY SOVIETS WAS SEPT. 11 ALEXANDER BOVIN COMMENTARY IN IZVESTIA, A SOBER, NON-POLEMICAL DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL ASPECTS. BOVIN REGARDS CONGRESS AS EFFORT TO APPORTION POWER AFTER THE ABORTIVE LIN PIAO COUP PLOT, WHICH HE DESCRIBES GRAPHICALLY IN QUOTATIONS FROM DOCUMENT ENTITLED "THESES OF THE 571

OBJECTIVE." (HE ADMITS THAT DOCUMENT MAY BE FABRICATION OF KANG SHENG'S AGENCY, BUT FINDS IT IN ANY EVENT A PERSUASIVE PICTURE OF INTRIGUE.) LIKE MFA, HE CONCLUDES THAT NEW ROUND OF POLITICAL INFIGHTING HAS BEGUN. UNLIKE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES SUMMARIZED RECENTLY IN SOVIET PRESS, BOVIN DOES NOT ADDRESS PRC FOREIGN POLICY OR ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIALIST CAMP.  
DUBS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 SEP 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** collinp0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973MOSCOW10982  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS DUBS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** MOSCOW  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730940/aaaabdfs.tel  
**Line Count:** 177  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** collinp0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 JUL 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24-Jul-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 FEB 2002 by collinp0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SOVIET REACTION TO CHINESE PARTY CONGRESS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, CH, UR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005